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No Free Lunch:
How Settlement Can Reduce the Legal System’s Ability to Induce Efficient Behavior
Abstract
While there is widespread agreement that it is better for cases to settle than go to trial, the
arguments in favor of settlement have typically overlooked how settlement affects one of the
most important functions of the legal system: influencing the behavior that gives rise to lawsuits.
This essay argues that, in some cases, settlement can impair the ability of the legal system to
deter harmful behavior without chilling desirable behavior. Where it exists, this effect is a
fundamental property of settlement in that there is no way to change other legal rules to eliminate
it. Because settlements also have important benefits, such as the saving of legal costs, this essay
does not argue for any across the board prohibition of settlement. Rather, it suggests that judges
should be more circumspect about encouraging settlements and that there may even be situations
where some restrictions on settlement are warranted.
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I. Introduction

There is widespread support for the idea that it is better for cases to settle than to go to
trial. “Most lawyers, judges, and law professors think it is good that so few cases are tried…The
reasons most commonly given for discouraging trials are that settlements conserve resources and
enable parties to resolve their differences amicably. Settlements are said to reduce attorneys’
fees and court costs, free space on crowded dockets, speed relief to injured plaintiffs, and avoid
the need for judges to decide difficult legal questions.”1 While these arguments in favor of
settlement are undoubtedly valid, they overlook the role that settlement plays in one of the most
important functions of the legal system: influencing the behavior that gives rise to lawsuits.
Ideally, the legal system will deter people and firms from taking actions that cause more
harm to others than the benefit those actions provide to themselves while not discouraging those
activities whose benefits are greater than their harms. To accomplish this task, parties whose
actions cause harm must expect that they will have to fully compensate the victims for that harm.
That way, the party deciding whether to take some action will consider not just the benefits to
herself, but also any harms that her action may cause others. Equally important, parties whose
actions do not cause any harm must not be required to compensate a victim for some harm she
has suffered that is caused by something else. This will prevent the threat of legal action from
chilling desirable activities.
When analyzing the desirability of settlement, then, one must look beyond settlement’s
effects after the filing of suit. One must ask how settlement affects the ability of the legal system
to deter undesirable activities without chilling desirable ones. While many issues relating to
settlement have received substantial attention, the vast majority of economic analyses of
1

Jules Coleman and Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. Phil. & Pol. 102, 102-103 (1986).
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settlement have focused on explaining why not all cases settle and on how different legal rules
affect the likelihood of settlement.2 The more basic question of whether or not settlement is
necessarily desirable has received much less attention.3 Some scholars have argued that there
may be too little settlement because parties do not care about the litigation costs they impose on
the other side or the court when they refuse to settle.4 Others have noticed that under certain,
fixed, legal rules, settlement can sometimes lead to less deterrence than trial.5 As these authors
point out, however, in the settings they analyze, one can always change the rules governing
2

See, for example, William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. Law & Econ. 61 (1971); Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973);
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of
Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect
Information, 15 RAND J. of Econ. 404 (1984); Robert Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Lit. 1067 (1989); and Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the
Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, 25 RAND J. of Econ. 204 (1994).
3
Some legal scholars have criticized the judicial promotion of settlement. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
Yale L.J. 1073 (1984) was one of the first. His main objections to settlement were that settlements could be unfair
due to an imbalance of power between the parties; that settlements may be made by agents who do not necessarily
have the best interests of the parties at heart; and that settlements may create peace but do not necessarily create
justice. Fiss’s second criticism of settlement is quite valid, though I will not discuss it here since it does not relate to
the issues I discuss in this essay. Fiss’s first and the third criticisms do bear some relation to my argument. The
problem with the imbalance of power argument is that one’s power in settlement negotiations relates directly to
one’s power in litigation. If one party’s lack of power leads them to accept an “unfair” settlement (however one
defines fairness), it must be because this party expects a worse outcome should she have to litigate the case. That
said, my argument against settlement is based on an imbalance of information between the parties (the defendant has
more information about the likely result of the suit than does the plaintiff). This problem with this imbalance,
however, is not that it leads the less informed party to do worse than she would do if she were to litigate the case to
judgment. If that were the case, the less informed party (the plaintiff) would simply refuse to settle. Instead, the
problem is that settlements between differentially informed parties can often make it more difficult for the threat of
lawsuits to deter harmful behavior without also deterring valuable behavior. While this is something that potential
plaintiffs should care about before they are injured, once they are injured and are engaged in settlement negotiations,
plaintiffs bargain so as to maximize their recovery, not to improve the defendant’s incentives to take only those
actions that create more benefit than harm. While, in some sense, this argument can be seen as one manifestation of
Fiss’s claim that settlements create peace but not justice, Fiss did not explain his argument this way. Other legal
articles questioning the wisdom of promoting settlement include Jules Coleman and Charles Silver, Justice in
Settlements, 4 Soc. Phil. & Pol. 102 (1986); Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an
Adversary System, 44 Hastings L.J. 1, 3-4 (1992); Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlement, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339 (1994); and Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost:
Why Encourage Settlement and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 221
(1999). None of these articles argue that settlement can reduce effectiveness of the legal system’s ability to regulate
behavior.
4
See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal
System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575 (1997) and Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality
of Suit and Settlement, 19 Int’l R. of Law and Econ. 99 (1999).
5
See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials, 8 Int’l R. of
Law and Econ. 109 (1988) and Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on the Divergence between the Private and the Social
Motive to Settle under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. Legal Stud. 613 (1997).
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damages so that settlement does not produce less deterrence than trial.6 That is, in these cases,
there are better was to maintain deterrence than by discouraging settlement. In this essay, by
contrast, I show that settlement can fundamentally reduce the ability of the legal system to deter
harmful behavior without chilling desirable behavior. This effect is more fundamental than the
effects described in prior analyses because there is no way to alter the rules for awarding
damages to correct for the problems that settlement creates.
The first case I consider, in Section III.A, is when the defendant has superior information
about the damages that the plaintiff will receive at trial.7 When the defendant is deciding
whether to take some action that might result in her being sued ,8 her best estimate of what she
might have to pay the plaintiff is what she expects the settlement or trial outcome to be. Because
trials are structured to reveal all the relevant information that both parties have, the defendant
will likely expect the trial outcome to closely reflect her superior information about the
magnitude of the harm she will cause. If the parties settle, on the other hand, that settlement will
probably not reflect the all of the information the defendant has: the plaintiff cannot insist on a
higher settlement when the defendant knows damages are likely to be large if the plaintiff does
not know this information. As a result, the defendant will base her decision to act not on all the
information she has, but rather only on the information she expects the plaintiff to have. This
means that if the information that only the defendant has indicates that her action is significantly
more harmful than the plaintiff will expect, the defendant can expect to settle the case for
substantially less than the true level of harm her action will cause. This may lead her to engage
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Ibid.
This situation will probably only occur in a minority of cases. I argue in Section III.B, however, that there are still
many types of cases where the defendant may have superior information about the magnitude of damages.
8
More precisely, here I am speaking of the party that will become the defendant should it take an action that results
in a lawsuit. For simplicity, I will just refer to this party as the defendant even though she is not a defendant at this
stage.
7
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in an activity that she knows will cause great harm only because she has the opportunity to settle
the case without going to trial.
The second case occurs when the defendant has superior information about her
culpability for the plaintiff’s harm, and, thus, the probability that she will be found liable should
the case proceed to trial. I show that, in this instance, the problem with settlement is that it can
reduce the accuracy of the legal system. This is important because increasing the accuracy of the
legal system is the only way to deter more harmful activity without also chilling more beneficial
activity that could be mistaken for harmful activity. Settlement can reduce the accuracy of the
legal system because culpable defendants have a greater incentive to settle than do blameless
ones. Therefore, if settlement does not occur, the plaintiff is more likely to be against a
blameless defendant. I show that this will often lead the plaintiff to put less effort into trial
preparation, which will reduce the accuracy of the trial process. The less accurate the trial
process, the less effective the legal system is at deterring harmful activity without chilling
beneficial activity. Section IV.A provides a much more detailed explanation of this argument.
Notice that for settlement to lead to less deterrence of harmful activities or more chilling
of desirable activities, the defendant, the party whose behavior is the subject of the lawsuit, must
have better information about a critical aspect of the case than does the plaintiff. Therefore,
these arguments do not suggest that all settlements create these problems. Moreover, even when
settlement does impair the legal system’s ability to appropriately influence behavior, because
settlement does reduce legal costs, this essay does not advocate any explicit rule that restricts or
prohibits settlement. Instead, the purpose of this essay is to identify this downside of settlement
that has previously been ignored and to suggest that there are cases where judges might want to
consider restricting settlement or, at least, not explicitly promoting it.
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The next section describes how the legal system favors settlement over trial. Section III
presents the analysis of how settlement can undermine deterrence (relative to the situation where
all cases go to trial) when the defendant has superior information about the harm her action
causes. Subsection A explains this theory. Subsection B discusses the types of cases where this
theory is applicable. Section IV analyzes how settlement can lead to the chilling of desirable
behavior (again, relative to the situation where all cases go to trial) when the defendant has
superior information about whether or not her action is responsible for the plaintiff’s harms.
Again, subsection A explains this theory and subsection B discusses the types of cases where this
theory is likely to be relevant. Section V discusses the implications these theories have for legal
policy. In particular, rather than recommending any hard and fast rule against settlements, this
section suggests that in some cases judges should have the discretion to not enforce settlement
agreements. Section VI concludes.

II. Policy Tilt Toward Settlement

While many judges have viewed promotion of settlement as an important part of their
judicial role for some time,9 promotion of settlement first became formally part of legal policy
with the amendment of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1983. This rule now
suggests that judges may take action to encourage the parties to settle and allows judges to
impose sanctions on parties who do not participate in pretrial settlement conferences.10 Rule 68
9

See Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 Judicature 256. Surveys of
judges even before the 1983 amendment to Rule 16 revealed that over 75 percent of trial judges described
themselves are interventionist in their promotion of settlement. This intervention was predominantly through subtle
suggestions, though over 10 percent of judges reported using direct pressure to promote settlement. John Paul Ryan,
Alan Ashman, Bruce D. Sales, and Sandra Shane-Dubow, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK
STYLES AND PERFORMANCE 177 (1980).
10
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16
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now also allows the judge to impose costs on a plaintiff who refused a settlement offer that turns
out to be more favorable to her than the trial outcome.11 The “plain purpose of Rule 68 is to
encourage settlement and avoid litigation.”12 Rule 26(f) requires attorneys to discuss the
possibility of settlement with their clients.13 Even the Federal Rules of Evidence promote
settlement. Under Rule 408, settlement offers and discussions are not admissible at trial to
promote “the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes.”14 Congress has
also endorsed the promotion of settlement. The Civil Justice Reform Act15 encourages judges to
promote settlements as a way to reduce the expense and delay in the federal court system.16
While the public policy favoring settlement has some dissenters,17 it “has generally
received enthusiastic support from the commentators and the courts.”18 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly endorsed the idea that settlement is preferable to trial. As far back as the nineteenth
century, the Court declared, “settlement in matters of litigation, or in dispute, without recourse to
litigation, are generally favored.”19 Since that time, the Court has consistently emphasized the
importance of the public policy rationale for settlements.20 The next two sections, however,
show that there are cases where there is a strong public policy rationale against settlements.

11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).
13
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
14
Fed R. Evid. 408 advisory committee’s note.
15
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. IV 1992).
16
For a complete description of all the mechanisms available to promote settlement, see Stephen McG. Bundy, The
Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 Hastings L.J. 1, 3-4 (1992).
17
See, Supra, note 3.
18
Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 Hastings L.J. 9, 36 (1996).
19
St. Louis Mining and Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898).
20
See Williams v. First Nat’l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985); Evans v.
Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 736-38 (1986); and McDermott Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1467 (1994) among others.
It should be noted, however, that some have argued that three recent Court decisions have not emphasized the
importance of the policy favoring settlement as much as the Court has in the past, see Margaret Meriwether Cordray,
Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 Hastings L.J. 9, 36 (1996).
12
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III. Settlement and Deterrence

A. The Theory
In both this section and the following one, Section IV, the analysis is confined to cases
where a potential defendant has a choice to take some action (engage in some activity) that may
cause her to be sued by some plaintiff.21 I restrict attention to suits for damages. Furthermore, I
will make the standard assumption that the defendant decides to do this action if and only if her
benefit from doing so exceeds her expectation of how much she is likely to pay in damages and
legal costs (what I will call her expected liability). This assumption does not imply that the
defendant only cares about money. Her benefit from the activity may be non-monetary.
Similarly, this benefit could reflect any disutility the defendant feels from harming another
person. The following argument also does not rely on the assumption that the defendant can
necessarily predict with certainty the outcome of the trial or of settlement. What is required is
that the defendant forms some estimate of the average costs of this action (her expected liability),
so that she can weigh expected costs and benefits. In what follows, I will speak in terms of
expected liability, but the reader should understand that this is only an average; the defendant
usually will not know her exact liability precisely.
To analyze the effect of settlement on deterrence, I build on the asymmetric information
model of settlement bargaining that has become the standard in the law and economics
literature.22

Given that litigation is costly to both parties, if each party could perfectly predict

the outcome of a trial, then there is a settlement (or a range of settlements) that both parties
21

I will use male pronouns for the plaintiff and female pronouns for the defendant.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. of Econ. 404 (1984)
for a mathematical model of settlement bargaining when one party has superior information about the likely trial
outcome. This paper, like most, does not consider the defendant’s decision about whether to do the act that results
in the lawsuit.

22
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would agree is preferable to going to trial. For example, if both parties know that the defendant
will be found liable for $100 in damages and both would have to spend $20 litigating the case,
any settlement where the defendant pays the plaintiff between $80 and $120 will make both sides
better off than going to trial. In fact, even if the parties cannot predict with certainty the outcome
of the trial (which is certainly the case), the preceding statement remains valid so long as both
parties have similar estimates of the outcome of the trial. That is, if both parties think the
defendant will probably have to pay the plaintiff $100 at trial, then they will both think they will
be better off on the average with a settlement between $80 and $120. Similarly, if the defendant
and the plaintiff both think the defendant will probably be liable for damages of $120, then they
will settle for something between $100 and $140. The important thing to notice is that the range
of possible settlements shifts up when the estimate of the likely damage award increases. This
means that the defendant’s action becomes more costly to her the greater the harm her action will
cause.23
If the defendant has much better information about the outcome of a trial than the
plaintiff does, however, then this is not necessarily the case. Consider, for example, an antitrust
case where the defendant, because she is very knowledgeable about the industry, has a very good
idea of how much her anti- competitive conduct cost consumers. The plaintiff, on the other hand,
may know that the defendant behaved anti-competitively, and so a court is very likely to find her
liable, but may not have a very good idea of what prices would have been absent the anticompetitive conduct. If the case does not settle, however, the discovery and trial processes will
likely uncover a great deal of the information that the defendant has about the damages from its

23

In order to design a damage rule that provides perfect incentives, even when both the plaintiff and defendant are
equally well-informed, one needs to know where in the settlement range the defendant expects the settlement to be.
But, even if incentives are not perfect, with equally well-informed parties the defendant will have less incentive to
do the action the greater its harm, even if she expects to settle the case.
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anti-competitive conduct. That is, while both sides may have similar expectations about the
probability of liability, the defendant probably has much more precise information about the
magnitude of the damages a court will award should the case proceed to trial.
For example, the plaintiff may think that damages can be anywhere between $50 and
$150, while the defendant may know exactly what (number between $50 and $150) her damages
will be.24 Of course, any given settlement offer will be more attractive to the defendant the
higher she expects the damages awarded at trial to be. For example, if the plaintiff offered to
settle for $100, the defendant will prefer this to going to trial if she knows damages will be $80
or more (since by going to trial she will have to also pay $20 in legal costs). If she know that
damages will be less than $80, however, then she will reject this offer.25 Of course, $100 is not
necessarily the best offer the plaintiff can make. But, no matter what offer he does make, the
same reasoning implies that the defendant will only accept this offer if she knows the sum of the
damages she will likely pay plus her legal costs will exceed this settlement offer. That is, a
defendants who knows her action caused large harms will settle, while if she knows her action
caused only a small amount of harm, then she will go to trial.

24

While, this example assumes the defendant has perfect knowledge of damages, what is critical is simply that the
defendant has better knowledge about what damages will be than does the plaintiff.
25
Of course, in real settlement negotiations, there is more than one opportunity to settle. Nonetheless, even in these
situations, defendants who know that damages will be large are more likely to settle than those who know damages
will be small. The plaintiff cannot just assume that a defendant who resists settling for a given amount actually
expects damages to be lower if the case goes to trial. If he did make this assumption, and thus offered to settle for
less, then even a defendant who expects large damages could resist and obtain a lower settlement offer. That is, if a
defendant who expects damages to be small is not more likely to have to go to trial than a defendant who expects
damages to be large, then there is no reason for every defendant not to pretend in settlement negotiations that she
expects damages to be small. If the plaintiff always believes her, he will end up settling for a small amount even
when damages would have been quite high. Because this is not in the plaintiff’s interest, he will not accept a lower
settlement offer just because the defendant has already rejected a larger one. As a result, defendants who expect
damages to be large have a much greater incentive accept any given settlement offer than those who expect damages
to be small (because they will not do as well in a trial). Of course, this assumes that the defendant cannot, or does
not wish to, reveal all the information she has about the likely damages during settlement negotiations. Certainly,
before discovery the plaintiff has no way of knowing whether the defendant is hiding some information that might
suggest damages are large. Moreover, the defendant may be hesitant to reveal too much information that might help
the plaintiff should the case go to trial.
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If the defendant knows the plaintiff’s ability to make a settlement offer is completely
unrestricted, then the defendant’s expected liability for its action is capped at the magnitude of
the settlement offer she expects the plaintiff will make. In our example, if the defendant expects
the plaintiff will offer to settle for $100, then she knows that she will never have to pay more
than this. As a result, in this example the defendant will always do the action in question
whenever her benefit from that activity exceeds $100. This is true no matter how much harm
this action may cause the plaintiff. Because the defendant can expect to receive a settlement
offer, she has no incentive to tailor her decision to do this act to the actual level of harm
whenever her benefit from the act exceeds the settlement offer she expects to receive. In our
example, say the defendant’s benefit from the activity is $110. She will engage in the activity
even if the harm it causes to the plaintiff is $120 or even $150 because she knows she can settle
the lawsuit for $100.
Of course, if her benefit is below the settlement offer she expects to receive (say $80),
then she will not do the act if she knows that actual damages will be large enough that she would
want to settle.26 In this case, she will compare her benefit to the actual damages (plus her legal
costs) when deciding on whether to do the action or not. So, if her benefit is $80, then she will
engage in the activity if it causes harm of less than $60 (because she will also have to pay $20 in
legal costs). Therefore, actual damages continue to affect deterrence when the defendant’s
benefit from the activity is low (below the expected settlement offer) but not when it is high
(above the expected settlement offer).
This reduces the ability of the legal system to induce the defendant to act appropriately.
When the defendant must pay all the costs associated with her action, then she will have the
26

The plaintiff’s settlement offer can still be optimal if the plaintiff does not know the defendant’s benefit. If the
defendant’s benefit could be larger than this settlement offer, then there is nothing necessarily irrational about
making a settlement offer that turns out to be larger than the defendant’s benefit in some cases
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incentive to do the act if and only if her benefits exceed the totalcosts. As demonstrated above,
when damages equal the harm from the activity, settlement will weaken deterrence because of
the way settlement acts like a cap on damages. More fundamentally, notice that there is no way
to adjust the damage rule to solve this problem.27 Say that we tried to increase the damages by
some amount for every possible level of harm to correct this problem. This would naturally
increase the optimal settlement amount thatthe plaintiff would accept (because her expected
recovery at trial would increase). This, however, does not eliminate the damage cap effect of
settlement; it only changes the monetary value of the cap. In our example, if damages were set
to harm plus $20, the plaintiff might offer to settle for $120 rather than $100. Notice that while
the settlement amount is now larger, the defendant will still accept the settlement offer if she
know the harm she causes exceeds $80, just as before. (If the harm is $80, then damages will be
$100 and she will also pay $20 in legal costs, making the total cost of trial $120 when harm is
$80). So, when the harm exceeds $80, the defendant will still decide to do the activity if and
only if her benefit exceeds the settlement amount (now $120). Thus, her decision will still be the
same whether the harm is $80 or $150. So, increasing the damages the defendant must pay at
trial does not change the fact that the defendant will not consider the actual harm her action
causes whenever that harm exceeds $80 (or, more generally, when the harm is large enough to
make accepting the settlement preferable to going to trial).
Of course, settlement does have a major offsetting advantage: it reduces legal costs. In
many situations, when legal costs are substantial, these cost savings will outweigh the less
efficient incentives that settlement necessarily creates. In our example, one situation where this

27

See Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement, Unpublished (2003) (available from the
author upon request) for a formal proof of these results
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would be true is where the defendant’s benefit is greater than $150. In this case, it is always
efficient for the defendant to do the act when she can settle, so there is no reason to deter it.
That said, this would not happen as often as one might think. If settlement offers are
regulated to prevent the lowball offers that create this problem, not all of the cases that would
have settled will be litigated. Many of these cases will no longer exist because the defendant will
not do the act that creates the lawsuit in the first place. By improving deterrence, limitations on
settlement will reduce the number of cases filed. Because this reduces the increase in legal costs
that settlement limitations create, there is much more scope for the benefits from improved
incentives to outweigh the increased legal costs.28 Coming back to our example, this will happen
when the defendant’s benefit from the act is just barely greater than the settlement amount (say it
is $101 in the case where the plaintiff makes an offer of $100 because damages equal harm).
Now, if settlement is prohibited, then the defendant will only do the act if it causes a harm of less
than $81 (so her damages plus legal costs will be less than $101). So, the only cases that would
have settled that now go to trial are those where the harm is between $80 and $81. All the other
cases that would have settled, when the harm exceeds $81, do not exist because the threat of
liability now deters the defendant from doing the action.
Of course, prohibiting settlement, even in this case, is not always desirable. If the
defendant’s action causes a harm of less than $101, then we do not want to deter it since the
benefit exceeds the harm as long as there are no legal costs (because the case settles). On the
other hand, prohibiting settlement to deter this activity is desirable if the activity causes a harm
that exceeds $101. Unfortunately, it is also true more generally that whether or not settlement is
desirable depends on both the benefits and the harms of the activity, making it difficult to write a

28

Wickelgren, supra note 26, shows that there cases where the incentive benefits of prohibiting settlement outweigh
the legal costs saved for any settlement offer that actually results in some cases settling.
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general rule that always allows settlement when and only when its advantages outweigh its
disadvantages.

B. Domain of Application
Of course, this theory does not justify a blanket prohibition on settlement. In fact, in
most cases, the central premise of the theory probably will not hold. Recall, that the main
building block for the argument in the last section was that the defendant knows more about the
harm that her activity causes than does the plaintiff. More precisely, the defendant must know
more about the likely harm both when she does the act and when she is engaged in settlement
negotiations than the plaintiff knows when she is in settlement negotiations.
In many cases, personal injury is an obvious example, this will almost never be true. A
physically injured plaintiff can more easily determine the extent of her own injuries than can the
defendant. Similarly, in most contract cases, the breached-against party will know more
precisely than the breaching party what the harm from the breach was. That said, there are many
classes of cases where the premises of the theory will often hold. In antitrust, as discussed in the
preceding section, the defendant’s greater knowledge of the market will usually put her in a
much better position to compare the actual situation with the “but-for” world where there was no
anti-competitive activity.
This problem can also occur in some tort cases. Say a defendant emits a chemical that
affects the yields of crops on nearby farms. Because crop yields are quite variable, the plaintiff
cannot simply compare his current yield to his normal yield to accurately determine how much
the chemical affected his yields. Instead, the best evidence of the effect of the chemical on crop
yields will probably come from knowledge of the chemical itself. This is information that the
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defendant, the producer of the chemical, is in a much better position to know than is the plaintiff,
putting her in a much better position to estimate compensatory damages.29

IV. Settlement and the Chilling Effect

A. The Theory
The previous section showed how settlement could weaken deterrence when the
defendant has an informational advantage about the magnitude of damages that a court will
award. While, as argued above, such situations are important, they are probably less prevalent
than cases where the defendant knows more than the plaintiff about the probability that the court
will find her liable. This section analyzes this case and shows that settlement can reduce the
legal system’s ability to distinguish between legitimate and harmful activities, thereby making
the tradeoff between under-deterring harmful activities and chilling legitimate activities worse.
One example of the situation that I have in mind concerns a factory that emits a chemical
into the air or water. Because the factory owner knows a great deal about her production process
and has the opportunity to study it, she probably knows much more about whether this chemical
causes cancer or not than do the people who live near the factory. If a person who lives near the
factory gets cancer, he will not know whether the chemical emitted by the factory could have
29

A very similar effect can occur in contract cases. Consider contracts for the delivery of some input into a
production process. If the defendant breaches by delivering a different input than what the contract specifies, the
plaintiff will probably know. However, due to the plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages, he will often have to use the
input anyway (if an alternate source is not available or is very costly). If many other factors, aside from the quality
of this input, affect the plaintiff’s output (some of which could be very hard to measure), his actual output with this
input may not provide very good evidence of how much the substandard input reduced his output over what it would
have been with the correct input. Much better evidence may come from evidence about the relative quality of the
two inputs. The defendant, because she produces these goods, will have much better information about this issue
than will the plaintiff. Similarly, if the contractually specified input represented a technological advance, then the
plaintiff may not know what its production capabilities or costs would have been had the contract been performed.
The defendant, because it was making the input, may know much more about its likely performance characteristics.
This puts the defendant in a much better position than the plaintiff to estimate expectation damages.
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caused his cancer or not. Say he sues the factory owner. While much of what the defendant
knows will likely come out at trial (and maybe during discovery), at the time of the suit, the
defendant knows much more about how likely she is to be found liable than does the plaintiff.
The argument that settlement can make it more difficult to deter harmful behavior
without chilling harmless behavior has two mainsteps. First, I show that the possibility of
settlement causes the plaintiff to prepare less for trial (if there is no settlement) than she would if
settlement were prohibited. Second, I show that the less the plaintiff prepares for trial, the
smaller is the difference between the expected liability for harmful behavior and the expected
liability for harmless behavior. This, obviously, makes it harder to deter harmful behavior
without chilling harmless behavior.
I now show that the possibility of settlement causes the plaintiff to prepare less for trial
(the first step). First, notice that if the plaintiff makes a settlement offer, the defendant has a
much stronger incentive to accept this offer if she has evidence that the chemical emitted by her
factory might cause cancer than if she has strong evidence that the chemical is completely
benign. The reason is that a defendant who knows the chemical she emitted causes cancer is
more likely to be found liable at trial than is a defendant who knows the chemical she emitted is
benign, making trial more costly for the former defendant than for the latter.30 Of course, the
plaintiff knows this, so if the defendant rejects the settlement offer, he will infer that it is more
likely that the defendant has evidence that the chemical is benign than that she has evidence that
it causes cancer.
30

A simple example can illustrate this point. Say the damages will be $1 million if the defendant is found liable for
the plaintiff’s cancer. If the defendant knows her chemical emission did not cause this cancer, then the probability
that the court will mistakenly find her liable may be quite small, say 5-10 percent. On the other hand, if the
chemical is carcinogenic, then the probability that the court will correctly find the defendant liable may be quite
high, say 70-80 percent. Thus, a defendant whose chemical emission was dangerous will accept a settlement offer
of $700,000, and maybe even an offer of $750,000, but if the defendant knows her chemical emission was benign,
she will certainly reject this offer.
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Now, consider the effect of this inference on the plaintiff’s optimal litigation strategy. If
the chemical is benign, then it will usually be the case that it will be quite hard, maybe
impossible, for the plaintiff to find credible evidence thatthe chemical caused his cancer.
Therefore, the more likely the plaintiff thinks it is that the chemical is benign, the less incentive
he has to spend a lot of time and money searching for evidence that it is dangerous. That is, the
plaintiff’s effort in preparing for a case is likely to be more effective when the defendant really is
responsible for the plaintiff’s injury than when she is not. Because of this, the plaintiff will
expend less effort the less likely she thinks it is that the defendant really is culpable.31 Because
the defendant is less likely to be truly culpable if she has rejected a settlement offer than if no
settlement is made, this establishes the first step of the argument: the possibility of settlement
reduces the plaintiffs trial preparation effort.32
I now turn to the second step in the argument, showing that less trial preparation effort
leads to a smaller difference between the expected liability from committing harmful acts and the
expected liability of committing harmless acts. Notice that the reason the plaintiff exerts less
effort when he believes the defendant is more likely to be blameless is because his effort is less
effective when the defendant is blameless than when she is responsible for the plaintiff’s injury.
Therefore, when the plaintiff prepares less for trial, this reduction in effort benefits the culpable
defendant more than the blameless one.33

31

Of course, there are many cases which are “slam-dunks” where the plaintiff does not need to do much preparation
at all in order to win. In these cases, however, the plaintiff usually knows it is a “slam-dunk” so the asymmetry of
information that this theory depends on is not present.
32
The possibility of settlement will not likely affect the defendant’s trial preparation effort since the defendant
knows whether she is culpable or blameless whether the plaintiff makes a settlement offer or not.
33
For example, spending an additional 100 hours on the case might increase the plaintiff’s chance of winning by 5
percent if the defendant is blameless but it might increase it by 10 percent if she is culpable. So, if the fact that the
defendant rejected a settlement offer causes the plaintiff not to spend this extra 100 hours preparing, then the
blameless defendant only has a 5 percent less chance of being found liable while the culpable defendant has a 10
percent less chance. The culpable defendant benefits more from this reduction in effort.
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While the plaintiff’s reduced incentive to prepare only occurs if the case does not settle, it
actually affects the defendant’s liability in all cases, whether they settle or not. A defendant who
is responsible for the plaintiff’s injury knows that if she rejects the settlement offer, the plaintiff
will not work as hard to win the case. This reduces her chance of being found liable if she
rejects the settlement and goes to trial. This reduces the amount the culpable defendant is willing
to pay to settle the case. Since the plaintiff knows this, she has to make a smaller settlement
offer.
When settlement is allowed, the plaintiff does not prepare as much if there is a trial and
this benefits the culpable defendant more than the blameless one. This makes the difference
between the culpable defendant’s expected liability and the blameless defendant’s expected
liability is less when settlement is possible. This effect is critical. The factory owner will decide
whether to emit the chemical by comparing her benefits from doing so (how much it reduces her
production costs or increases her output) with the expected liability that results. This is true
whether the evidence the factory owner has indicates that the chemical is carcinogenic or benign.
If the chemical is benign, however, then society does not want to chill this obviously beneficial
activity. If the chemical is carcinogenic, then it is quite possible that deterring this harmful
activity is optimal (unless the benefits are also quite large). The bigger the difference between
the expected liability faced by an owner that emits a dangerous chemical versus the expected
liability faced by an owner whose chemical emissions are benign, the more likely the legal
system can effectively deter the dangerous activity without chilling the benign one. For
example, if the benefit from emitting a carcinogenic chemical is $100,000 more than the benefit
of emitting a benign chemical, then it is impossible to deter a defendant from emitting the
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carcinogenic chemical without chilling the benign activity unless the difference in expected
liability is at least $100,000.
Of course, for any given damage rule, the impact of settlement is to reduce the
defendant’s expected liability because of the plaintiff’s reduced incentive to engage in
preparation effort should there be a trial. If the damage rule is flexible and can be adjusted based
on whether or not settlement restricted or unrestricted, however, then it is always possible to
adjust the damage rule such that culpable defendants (those whose activities are dangerous) face
the same expected liability in either regime (restricted or unrestricted settlement). Since
settlement tends to reduce the plaintiff’s incentive to invest in preparation, however, the
unrestricted settlement regime will have higher damages and lower preparation effort than the
regime with some restrictions on settlement. If each combination produces the same expected
liability for culpable defendants, the expected liability faced by blameless defendants in the
unrestricted settlement regime will necessarily be greater. This follows because the lower level
of plaintiff preparation effort when settlement is allowed does not benefit the blameless
defendant as much as it benefits the culpable one. Another way to see this is to notice that, since
unrestricted settlement reduces the difference in the expected liability facing culpable and
blameless defendants, if the liability for culpable defendants is held constant, unrestricted
settlement must increase the expected liability facing blameless defendants. That is, when the
defendant has better information about her likelihood of being found liable than does the
plaintiff, settlement worsens the tradeoff between under-deterring dangerous activities and
chilling legitimate activities.
As was the case in the prior theory, one should balance this cost of settlement against the
benefit it provides in terms of reducing litigation costs. For many cases, especially those where
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the defendant’s informational advantage is not that great, the chilling costs of settlement may not
be large. There is no reason to believe, however, that this will be true in general. In fact, one
can show that when the range of possible benefits the defendant can get from her activity is quite
small, the chilling effect from settlement will often outweigh the benefit that settlement provides
by reducing legal costs.34 The reason is that, to avoid completely chilling the harmless activity,
the optimal damage rule when settlement is unrestricted leads to much more harmful activity. As
a result, most of the cases that settle are cases that would not exist had settlement been restricted.
In general, however, the tradeoff between the chilling cost of settlement and the litigation costsaving benefit is quite complicated and probably varies a great deal by case. I discuss this issue
further in Section V.

B. Domain of Application
As with the prior theory, the argument against unrestricted settlement in this theory does
not apply in all cases. First, this argument requires that there is a harmless activity that could
easily be mistaken for a harmful activity. Second, the trial process must be an imperfect, but still
somewhat effective, means of distinguishing between the two activities. If the trial process were
perfect, then blameless defendants would never be found liable, so there would never be any
chilling. If the trial process were no more likely to find against a culpable defendant than against
a blameless one, then substantial chilling of harmless activities would be inevitable whether
settlement was restricted or not. Third, it must be important both to deter harmful activities and
not to chill harmless ones. If the harmful activity is not either not very harmful or produces
benefits that are almost as great as the harm that it causes, then society may not lose much by

34

See Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren, Chilling, Settlement, and the Accuracy of the Legal System,
http://www.nber.org/~confer/2003/si2003/papers/le/friedman.pdf, (2003) for a mathematical proof of this claim.
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immunizing this activity from liability so as not to risk chilling legitimate activities that might be
mistaken for this harmful activity. Alternatively, if the benefits from the harmless activity that
could be mistaken for a harmful activity are very small, then it is probably not worth the extra
legal costs from restricting settlement to avoid chilling this activity. It is only when minimizing
the risk of both types of legal errors (not deterring the dangerous activity and chilling the
beneficial activity) is quite important that we might want to restrict settlement in order to
improve the legal system’s ability to distinguish between the two types of activities.
One category of cases where it is very important to distinguish between culpable and
blameless defendants is medical malpractice. A recent study by the American Medical
Association (AMA) finds that more than 18 states are in "full blown medical malpractice
insurance crises."35 Some of the examples the study cites are:

• More than 50 percent of Arkansas physicians reported in a recent survey that they have
been forced to reduce or discontinue one or more medical services in the last two years
due to rapidly increasing medical liability premiums"
• Because of a legal climate making $1 million-plus jury verdicts and settlements more
common, an increasing number of Connecticut obstetricians are no longer delivering
babies, and premiums for neurosurgeons and other high-risk specialists are more than
$100,000…
• Women with gynecological cancers in three rural Missouri towns now have to drive more
than 100 miles because the only gynecological oncologist was forced to eliminate his
rural outreach clinic due to increasing insurance premiums.36
35
36

http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/9255-7341.html.
Ibid.
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Of course, the AMA’s view is that liability should almost never force doctors to stop performing
high-risk procedures or to stop practicing altogether. A less self-interested observer of these
facts, however, would conclude that stopping some doctors from performing some procedures is
probably desirable. While it is unlikely that 50 percent of all doctors in Arkansas are too
dangerous or unqualified to practice medicine safely, it would be a mistake to eliminate the
ability of medical malpractice lawsuits to block dangerous doctors from subjecting patients to
unnecessary risks. On the other hand, it hurts both patients and doctors if competent doctors stop
performing some procedures to avoid the risk of unjustified liability. In other words, it is very
important that our legal system distinguish as accurately as possible which doctors are dangerous
and which doctors are not, making it plausible that restrictions on medical malpractice
settlements might be justified.
Chilling is also a major concern in the enforcement of antitrust laws, especially
restrictions on predatory pricing or illegal vertical combinations. When predatory pricing does
effectively block entry into a market, the losses to consumers can be substantial. On the other
hand, threat of predatory pricing litigation can deter firms from charging low prices.37 Similarly,
while vertical mergers can sometimes cause significant anti-competitive harm, they can also
sometimes bring great benefits to consumers. In these cases, allowing for settlement may make
it more difficult to deter illegal activities without excessively chilling efficient legal behavior.
Patent litigation is another example where one can imagine that it may be difficult to distinguish
between legitimate innovation and patent infringement. When the legal system gets the wrong
answer in either direction, incentives to innovate are significantly diminished. Because of the

37

See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley, and Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal
Policy, 88 Georgetown Law J. 2241 (2000) for a discussion of the issues surrounding predatory pricing.
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importance of innovation, restricting settlement to enhance the accuracy of the legal system in
this area may justify the added litigation costs that result.38
There are also numerous examples where this theory of how settlements can be harmful
is not applicable. In most criminal cases involving street crime, this theory does not justify
restrictions on plea bargaining. Probably very little legitimate activity could be mistaken for
armed robbery, for example. Another set of examples would be any case where the contentious
issue is the identity of the party that committed the harmful act rather than whether the act itself
was harmful. Where there is no possibility that the act was harmless, chilling is not a concern.

V. Legal Policy Implications
In cases where the premises of either theory hold, the theories have some important
implications for the legal policy towards settlement. The general implication is that the standard
presumption that the legal system should encourage settlement may not always be valid. This
general observation, however, is not very helpful in specifying in what circumstances settlement
should be restricted and what forms those restrictions should take. This section provides some
discussion on both of these issues.
As the discussion in the domain of application sections suggests, it is probably very
difficult to describe precisely the set of cases where the key premises of either theory are likely
to hold. In addition, when these premises do hold, it is quite difficult, in the abstract, to say
when the incentive benefits of restricting settlement are likely to outweigh the added legal costs.
Because of this, any reappraisal of our legal policy towards settlement should probably not be
enshrined in any hard and fast rules. Given how much the facts of each individual case affect
38

There are potential antitrust reasons for opposing some patent settlements as well, particularly in the
pharmaceutical area. See Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=412123 (2003).
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whether that case is one where settlement should be restricted, the only feasible way to restrict
settlement without creating a rule that is both over- and under-inclusive is to set up general
guidelines but to give individual judges a great deal of discretion in regulating individual
settlement agreements.
How might judges regulate or discourage settlement? The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure already give judges the ability to encourage settlement via Rules 16 and 68. The
argument in this paper suggests that, at a minimum, judges should not always use these tools.
Actively discouraging settlement presents a more difficult issue. One approach would be to limit
the enforceability of the promise to terminate all litigation in connection with the case if a court
found that such a promise was against public policy. The grounds for it being against public
policy would be exactly the arguments presented in Section III and Section IV. That is, to
determine whether to set aside a settlement agreement, a judge would have to determine if the
defendant had superior information about either the likely damages or key facts that would
determine liability. If so, and if this informational advantage existed when the defendant was
deciding whether to do the activity that now is the subject of the lawsuit, then the judge will have
to weigh the incentive benefits of restricting settlements against the added litigation costs that
doing so would create.
It is worth pointing out that, under both theories, smaller settlementsare more
problematic than larger ones. When the defendant’s informational advantage concerns the
magnitude of the damages, the lower the settlement the lower the cap on expected liability. This
creates a wider region of possible harm where the defendant’s decision about whether to do the
act is based on a comparison of the benefit to the settlement amount rather than on a comparison
of the benefit to the actual harm she expects to cause. Similarly, if the defendant’s informational
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advantage concerns liability, then the smaller the settlement offer the more likely that a
defendant who rejects such an offer is blameless. This means that the reduction in preparation
effort caused by settlement will be even larger, leading to an even greater reduction in accuracy.
Thus, under either theory, evidence that the settlement amount was quite large given the type of
case should tend to make a judge lean against setting aside the settlement agreement.
Giving a judge discretion not to enforce the promise to terminate litigation in a settlement
agreement would greatly limit the attractiveness of small settlements in cases where the parties
felt the asymmetry of information was such that the settlement agreement might not be enforced.
Specifically, the defendant would be reluctant to agree to pay a small settlement amount to the
plaintiff since after the payment, the plaintiff might be able to continue the litigation if the judge
rules that the plaintiff’s promise to terminate litigation is unenforceable. Notice, however, that in
some cases it is crucial that the judge only set aside the promise to terminate litigation. If the
judge sets aside the entire settlement, then, since both parties agreed to the settlement, neither
may have an incentive to breach the contract, which would bring the settlement agreement to the
attention of the judge. While, in many cases, judges naturally become aware of settlement
agreements, this is certainly not the case for settlements that occur before a suit is ever filed. In
these cases, giving the plaintiff an incentive to breach the settlement agreement is essential to
restricting such agreements.
The key problem with this approach is that not only may judges not be able to perfectly
determine which settlements undermine deterrence or risk chilling sufficiently to warrant setting
them aside, but that the parties themselves often may not be able to accurately predict if their
settlement is likely to be enforced or not. This uncertainty could prevent settlements that do not
have substantial adverse effects on deterrence nor contribute to the chilling of legitimate
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activities. This drawback could be largely remedied by requiring a very high standard of proof,
such as “clear and convincing evidence,” that a settlement is against public policy before a judge
agrees to set it aside. While such a high standard of proof may greatly limit the effectiveness of
this system at preventing harmful settlements, it would surely be more effective at preventing
these settlements than the current system, and it would create only a minimal risk of undermining
desirable settlements.39 That is, this approach would represent an incremental improvement to
the problem of excessive settlement.
Another approach to discouraging settlements, and the first one that would occur to most
economists, would be to tax them. While taxes are often more efficient than direct regulation, in
this case taxing settlements is probably not the best way to discourage them.40 The main
problem is that taxes are not very flexible. For example, while the theory shows that larger
settlements weaken deterrence or increase chilling less than smaller ones, what constitutes a
large or small settlement will vary a great deal across cases. Giving judges the flexibility to set
aside a settlement allows them to vary this decision in accordance with the facts of the case much
more than would a standard tax.41
Since, under both theories, the defendant must have an informational advantage over the
plaintiff to make settlements harmful, judges should view post-discovery settlements much more
favorably than pre-discovery settlements. In many cases, discovery will greatly reduce the
defendant’s informational advantage. If discovery gives the plaintiff almost as much information
39

This would also reduce the attractiveness to the plaintiff of attempting to continue litigation after agreeing to a
settlement, so it would greatly limit the legal costs that this further hearing could create.
40
See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 Am. Law
and Econ. Rev. 1 (2002) for a discussion of why, in general, taxes are superior to direct regulation. Their argument
does not apply in this case because, unlike the case of a pollution tax, for example, the optimal tax here would
depend on the benefits as well as the costs of settlement. As a result, the information requirements for a tax are no
less severe then they are for direct regulation.
41
In principal, one could allow the judge to set the tax after examining the facts of the case, but this is then not very
different from setting aside the settlement and having a trial that examines the facts of the case and assesses
damages.
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as it gives the defendant about the magnitude of the damages or the likelihood of liability, then
settlements after discovery will not have the same negative effects on incentives as settlements
before discovery. The reason is that now the plaintiff can adjust his settlement offer based on
what he has learned about the likely damages or likelihood of liability. If discovery gives the
plaintiff as much information about damages as the defendant had at the time she decided to do
the act, then the magnitude of the settlement will vary with the harm the defendant expected to
cause. This is what is necessary to induce the defendant to make an efficient decision about
whether to engage in the activity in question. In the case where the dominant issue is the
probability of liability, if the plaintiff knows for sure whether the defendant is culpable or
blameless after discovery, then the defendant’s response to his settlement offer will not affect his
incentives to prepare for trial. Even if the plaintiff is still somewhat uncertain about the
defendant’s culpability, further effort at this point may not influence the accuracy of the outcome
nearly as much as preparation effort prior to or during discovery. Settlements at this stage may
not decrease the plaintiff’s accuracy producing effort very much. Therefore, restrictions on prediscovery settlements may often be sufficient (or close to sufficient) to solve the incentive
problem described above. This further limits the increased legal costs necessary to improve
deterrence or prevent excessive chilling of legitimate activities.

VI. Conclusions

This essay has argued that the settlement is not a free lunch. That is, while having cases
settle rather than go to trial may reduce legal costs and the burden on the courts, it also comes
with a real cost. At least in some cases, settlement can impair the legal system’s effectiveness at
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regulating behavior. This is drawback is very important, otherwise the best way to reduce legal
costs and the burden on the courts would be simply to prohibit lawsuits. Almost no one
advocates this, of course, because doing so would greatly reduce people’s and firms’ incentive to
care about the harm they cause to others. While the effect of settlement is much less drastic, one
still must weigh its cost savings against its negative effects on both the deterrence of harmful
activities and the chilling of beneficial ones. While these negative effects of settlement will not
be present in every case, or even in most cases, they do exist in a significant number of cases. In
such cases, legal policy should not necessarily encourage settlement. There may even be cases
where settlement should be discouraged. Because determining exactly when the negative
incentive effects of settlement outweigh the cost savings benefits depend on the precise details of
any individual case, hard and fast rules regulating settlement are not desirable. This essay argues
that a better alternative might be to give judges the discretion to consider not enforcing some
settlement agreements.
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